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I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, domestic counterterrorism and security experts might
scoff at the prospect of robust and effective action by the United Nations
(UN) as a central component of an effective counterterrorism strategy.
Indeed, in the context of addressing emerging threats to international
peace and security, critics have periodically cast the UN Security
Council (UNSC) as a little tin god when swift and responsive action is
stymied by political impasse, suffocated by layers of bureaucracy, or
impeded by vague and incomplete resolutions.1 Given the
nonexistence of a leviathan to provide for order and enforcement in
the international relations context, a classic realist may be particularly
skeptical of the efficacy of any international organization (IO) based
cooperative approach to a matter at the core of domestic security policy
such as counterterrorism. Yet, such a rationale is unduly agnostic,
antiquated, and disengaged from counterterrorism developments that
have been occurring for over two decades. Furthermore, a despondent
rejection of cooperative approaches to counterterrorism contributes to
schismatic phenomena and is doomed by an imperceptive failure to
recognize the global nature of the challenge. International legal
mechanisms have been characterized by increasing relevance and
efficacy, and there are strong theoretical justifications for relying on
them.
Few would argue that the UNSC has been apotheosized to the
status of an international leviathan with omnipotent authority to bring
stability to an anarchic international order. Yet, in reality the UNSC has
long been encroaching upon the sovereign rights of its creators in order
to protect them from one another, as well as perceived threats to
international peace and security. Exhibit onethe sweeping UN global
counterterrorism strategy equipped with binding obligations, sanctions,
and immense legal apparatus.2 This article focuses on the Al-Qaida
1 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Inspections and Their Enforcement: A Modest
Proposal, 96 AM. J. INTL L. 899, 899 (2002) (describing UN resolutions in response
to crises in Kosovo and Iraq as paper tigers, incapable of deterring violations);
Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INTL L.
319, 32125 (2012) (chronicling failures of UNSC responses to atrocities in Kosovo,
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia).
2 The UNSC global counter-terrorism strategy currently consist of four components
including; condemnation of discrete terrorist acts, imposition of sanctions, the creation
of universally binding counter-terrorism measures and capacity-building for counter-
terrorism at the national level. COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: MEETING THE CHALLENGES 13 (Larissa van den Herik &
2014-15] AUTOCATALYTIC REGIME THEORY PART I 35
asset-freezing aspect of that strategy. Despite the inability to divine a
credo of consistent and effective UNSC intervention to maintain
international peace and security, at least one prominent scholar familiar
with its mythos has characterized the UNSC as the deus ex machina of
the international legal system.3 Thus, it should hardly be a surprise
that the God in the international legal machine would be one of the
first actors to address the emergence of global terrorism and advance
the sole vehicle for truly global action against the twin threats of
Al- Qaida and the Taliban.4 Though it has subsequently been forged
into a critical response to the modern, archetypical conception of
terrorismthe 9/11 attacksthe rigorous sanctions regime created by
UNSC Resolution 1267 actually predates those attacks.5 Post 9/11, the
1267 sanctions regime, which has become central to UNSC international
peace and security policy, has surprised numerous security experts for
entailing, perhaps, a more robust and comprehensive approach than a
unilateral United States (US) effort could have entailed. On the other
hand, courts, commentators, scholars, and human rights advocates have
been critical of the lack of due process and transparency attendant to the
regime, which has evolved, in large part, to respond to such criticisms.6
Less attention has been given to mapping the macrocosmic
landscape of the counter financing of terror regime (1267 CFT
Regime) generated by Resolution 1267. Notably, the resolution
generated a polycentric regime by captivating and co-opting
transnational actors, States, jurists, scholars, and NGOs. It then
infused these actors, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
and the International Criminal Police Organization ( INTERPOL), with
Nico Schrijver eds. 2013) [hereinafter COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES]. UNSC
Resolution 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which coexists
with the 1267 Committee. Id. Together they constitute the two principal pillars of the
Security Council counter-terrorism campaign. Id. In 2004, the UNSC established a
nonproliferation committee in Resolution 1540. Id. The Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established by the Secretary-General in 2005 to
coordinate the numerous post 9/11 counterterrorism directives. See Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF), UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/
ctitf/index.shtml (last visited May 6, 2015).
3 See José E. Alvarez, Review Essay: Between Law and Power, 99 AM. J. INTL
L. 926, 926, 932 (2005).
4 U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team
Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1617 (2005) and 1735 (2006)
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. S/2007/677 (Nov. 29, 2007).
5 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
6 See generally Dominic Hoerauf, The United Nations Al-Qaida Sanctions
Regime After UN Resolution 1989: Due Process Still Overdue?, 26 TEMP. INTL &
COMP. L.J. 213 (2012).
36 U. MIAMI NATL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. V:33
immense normative power. Interactions between these elemental actors
have resulted in accelerated global dissemination of the CFT legal norms
and the evolution of those normsan autocatalytic evolutionary
phenomenon.7 This evolution has included substantive and structural
permutations as well as increased transparency and the implementation
of due process safeguards. Through the autocatalytic process the
1267 CFT Regime has developed into a formidable regulatory and
enforcement system characterized by extensive incorporation of its
dictates into domestic laws. The process has impelled cooperation
among all relevant actors leading to capacity building, transfer of
technical expertise, training, and information sharing. Finally, research
supports the hypothesis that the 1267 CFT Regime has enhanced
success in constraining terrorist targets. The 1267 CFT experience
provides the initial case study for autocatalytic regime theorya novel
conception of certain cooperative enterprises in international relations.
The case study provides a crucial platform for understanding the
implications and potential of autocatalytic regimes.
This project conceives the 1267 CFT Regime as an exercise in
polycentric global governance, refined through global administrative law
(GAL). Part I traces the 1267 CFT Regime back to its genesis and
describes the current listing and delisting procedures. It further discusses
how the regime has evolved to incorporate GAL concordant mechanisms
and address criticisms by various commentators and international actors,
including the Court of Justice of the European Union in its landmark
Kadi decision. Part I also discusses persistent criticisms that continue
to be lodged against the regime. Part II of the article presents a
descriptive conceptual framework, autocatalytic regime theory, for
understanding the functioning of the 1267 CFT Regime. It discusses
how self-reinforcing and evolutionary interactions between elemental
actors within the 1267 CFT Regime have resulted in accelerated
global dissemination of legal norms. It then evaluates the praxis of
various elemental actors revealing a formidable regulatory framework
characterized by high levels of cooperation and implementation.
II. THE 1267 CFT REGIME
A. Inception and Evolution
In 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1267 in direct response to the
1998 bombing of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
7 For a definition of autocatalysis and an explanation of the reference herein, see infra
at section II.E.1.
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Salaam, Tanzania by Al Qaida.8 Resolution 1267 established the
Sanctions Committee (1267 Committee), consisting of all members of
the UNSC, to administer the targeted sanctions at the heart of the
regime.9 All states were called upon to impose an air embargo on the
Taliban and to freeze funds and other financial resources . . .
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, as
designated by the Committee.10 The Resolution authorized the 1267
Committee to seek information regarding implementation and required
States to cooperate fully . . . in supplying such information.11
Further, the resolution authorized the Committee to designate the
aircraft and funds or other financial resources relevant to
implementation.12 The list designating the individuals and entities subject
to the targeted sanctions became known as the Consolidated List.13 In
Resolution 1333, the UNSC expanded the targeted sanctions to include
Usama bin Laden and his associates and established a Committee of
Experts tasked with assisting the 1267 Committee and monitoring the
implementation of 1267 measures.14
In addition to the ascension of the use of force paradigm,
responses to the 9/11 attacks included the invigoration of the 1267
regime.15 On January 28, 2002 the UNSC passed Resolution 1390,
8 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Resolution 1267 and
its successor resolutions are universally legally binding instruments adopted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Id. at preamble; see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 457 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
9 See S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
10 Id. ¶ 4.
11 Id. ¶ 9.
12 Id. ¶ 6.
13 Resolutions 1988 and 1989 split the 1267 Committee into a Taliban Sanctions
Committee and an Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with similar mandates. See S.C. Res.
1988, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1988 (June 17, 2011) (Taliban); S.C. Res. ¶ 6 1267, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (Al-Qaida). This article only examines the CFT
aspects of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. However, for convenience it continues to
refer to the Al Qaida Sanctions Committee as the 1267 Committee and the Al-Qaida List
as the Consolidated List.
14 S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8(c), 15(a) U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000). The name and
configuration of this body has evolved over the course of subsequent resolutions, but its
mandate has essentially remained the same. See S.C. Res. 1363, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001) (Committee of Experts); S.C. Res. 1390, ¶¶ 7, 910,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002) (Monitoring Group); S.C. Res. 1526, ¶¶
67, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004) (Analytical Support and Sanctions
Monitoring Team).
15 On September 28, 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1373, a groundbreaking
resolution with immense normative implications for fundamental rules of international
law. See José E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An Empire of Law or the
Law of Empire?, 24 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 811, 817 (2009) (citing S.C. Res. 1373,
preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (explaining how resolution 1373
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which expanded the 1267 sanctions to include Usama bin Laden all
members of the Al-Qaida organization and and other individuals,
groups, undertakings and entities associated with them.16 Subsequent
UNSC resolutions further modified and refined the 1267 regime.
Resolution 1566, passed immediately after the Beslan school attacks of
September 2004, sought to circumvent the difficulties associated with
reaching a consensus-based definition of terrorism by defining it in
part, by reference to criminal acts . . . which constitute offences
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism . . . .17 In June 2005, the UNSC
adopted Resolution 1617 imposing new reporting requirements on
member States.18 Furthermore, it defined the critical phrase associated
with Usama bin Laden or Al-Qaida as:
! participating in the financing, planning, facilitating,
preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in
conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or
in support of;
! supplying, selling or transferring arms and related
materiel to;
! recruiting for; or
! otherwise supporting acts or activities of;
Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell,
affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof[.]19
The delisting procedure, incepted in Resolution 1730, established the
Focal Point within the Secretariat to receive delisting requests from
individual petitioners and administer the procedure.20 Three days after
the adoption of Resolution 1730, the UNSC passed Resolution 1735
requiring States to issue more detailed statements of the case when
modified the rules governing use of force by, inter alia: (1) characterizing large scale
terrorists attacks as armed attacks under Art. 51 of the UN Charter; (2)
justifying military force against a State for harboring terrorists and; (3) permitting the
continued use of military force even when the threat of continued attack is clandestine
and unpredictable)). The preamble of the resolution resembles global counterterrorism
legislation and the text of the resolution invokes virtually every conceivable
counterterrorism tool. See generally, S.C. Res. 1373, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(Sept. 28, 2001). While the resolution requires measures similar to those mandated by
Resolution 1267, it is not the subject of this article because it does not contain the strict
implementation requirements featured by Resolution 1267 and its progeny.
16 S.C. Res. 1390, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002). Resolution 1390 also
transformed the air embargo into a total travel ban. Id. ¶ 2(b).
17 S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
18 S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
19 Id. ¶ 2.
20 S.C. Res. 1730, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
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proposing designations.21 Additionally, Resolution 1735 took measures
to improve the transparency of the notification procedure by requesting
that States identify those parts of the statement of case which may be
publicly released for the purposes of notifying the [listee], and those
parts which may be released upon request to interested States.22
Furthermore, Resolution 1735 required the UN Secretariat to provide a
timely notification of designation to the Permanent Mission of the
country where the listee was believed to be, and called on States to
ensure the listee was notified.23 Such timely notification was to include
a copy of the publicly releasable portion of the statement of case, a
description of the effects of a designation, and the delisting procedures.24
In 2008, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1822, requiring the 1267
Committee to publish on its website narrative summaries of the
reasons for adding a name to the Consolidated List.25 The notification
requirements in resolution 1735 were reiterated and refined to include
a copy of the publicly releasable portion of the statement of case, any
information on reasons for listing available on the Committees website,
a description of the effects of designation, the delisting procedure,
and a list of available exemptions.26 Finally, Resolution 1822 directed
the 1267 Committee to conduct an annual review of all listees to ensure
the integrity of the Consolidated List.27
B. The Current Listing and Delisting Procedures
In December 2009, the UNSC issued Resolution 1904 which
contained a unique institutional improvement designed, in part, as a
response to criticisms regarding the lack of due process and
transparency lodged by States, NGOs,28 and the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) in its scathing Kadi I decision.29
Resolution 1904 made a significant effort to address these criticisms
21 S.C. Res. 1735, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006).
22 Id. ¶ 6.
23 Id. ¶¶ 1011.
24 Id. ¶ 11.
25 S.C. Res. 1822, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008).
26 Id. ¶ 17.
27 Id. ¶ 26.
28 See SUE E. ECKERT & THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, WATSON INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO TARGETED SANCTIONS: AN
UPDATE OF THE WATSON REPORT 2122 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 WATSON REPORT],
available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/2009_10_targeted_sanctions.pdf.
29 See COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 47. See also Kadi v.
Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 [hereinafter Kadi I]. At the time of Kadi I, the CJEU
was still known as the European Court of Justice. For the sake of consistency, this
article refers to the court as the CJEU throughout.
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by establishing the Office of the Ombudsperson (OP).30 In June 2010
the UN Secretary General appointed as the first OP, Kimberly Prost, a
former Canadian federal prosecutor, and former judge at the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.31
Twenty months after Resolution 1904, Resolutions 1988 and 1989
split the 1267 Committee into a Taliban Sanctions Committee and an
Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with similar mandates.32 With
resolution 1989, which further reformed delisting procedures and
strengthened the Office of the OP, we have the present iteration of the
listing and delisting procedures of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.33
Member States remain the only parties with the authority to submit
designations for inclusion on the Consolidated List and are called on to
include as much relevant information as possible with the submission.34
The submission must include a detailed statement of case, which is
releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State
identifies as being confidential . . . and may be used to develop
the narrative summary of reasons for listing . . . .35 The submission is
then circulated to the members of the 1267 Committee who must verify
that names proposed for listing merit inclusion.36 The determination is
made according to a reasonable basis standard.37 Submissions must be
approved by consensus and are so deemed if no objection is raised by
a Member State within five working days.38 If the Committee is unable
to reach consensus a Committee Member may refer the submission to
the UNSC.39 New designations are accompanied by a narrative
summarizing the reasons for the listing decision on the Committees
website.40 Within three days, notification of designation must be made to
the Permanent Mission of the country or countries where the individual
entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals, the country
of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is
30 S.C. Res. 1904, ¶¶ 2021, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
31 Press Release, Security Council, Press Conference to Present Ombudsperson of
Security Councils 1267 Committee ( July 15, 2010), http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/
100715_1267.doc.htm.
32 S.C. Res. 1988, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1988 (June 17, 2011) (Taliban); S.C. Res.
1989, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 ¶ 1 (June 17, 2011) (Al-Qaida).
33 S.C. Res. 1989, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011).
34 S.C. Res. 1904, ¶¶ 8, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
35 Id. ¶ 11.
36 Id. ¶ 17.
37 HOERAUF, supra note 6, at 218.
38 U.N. S.C., Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Guidelines of the Committee for the
Conduct of Its Work, ¶ 4(a)(b) (Apr. 15, 2013) [hereinafter 1267 COMMITTEE
GUIDELINES].
39 Id. at ¶ 4(a).
40 HOERAUF, supra note 6, at 218.
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known).41 Upon listing, Resolution 1989 authorizes the OP to send a
notification directly to the known address of an individual once the
relevant states have been informed.42 In an attempt to enable the listee
to effectively confront the accuser, a State making a submission is
strongly encourage[d] to approve the disclosure of its identity.43
Once a delisting request is filed, a speedy disposition requirement
ensures no matter is left pending for more than six months unless the
Committee determines extraordinary circumstances warrant additional
time.44 Resolution 1989 effectively shifts the burden of proof to an
objecting State by requiring it to provide reasons for objecting to
delisting.45 The OP has two months to gather relevant information from
the Sanctions Committee, the relevant States, the relevant UN bodies,
and the Monitoring Team.46 After the information-gathering period, the
OP must facilitate a two-month period of engagement, which may
include dialogue with the petitioner.47 Thus, the dialogue phase, in
practice, provides an opportunity for the listee to present her case to a
neutral decision maker. Subsequent to the dialogue period, the OP
submits to the Sanctions Committee a Comprehensive Report
summarizing the relevant information.48 On the basis of this report,
the Committee decides whether to approve the delisting request.49
Resolution 1989 largely transforms the OP into the de facto decision
maker because the delisting recommendation contained in the
Comprehensive Report can only be overturned by a unanimous decision
of the 1267 Committee or by referral to the UNSC.50 Thus far, the
OPs decision has never been overturned.51 The Committee generally
41 S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
42 S.C. Res. 1989, Annex II ¶ 16(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011).
43 Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis in original). Under Resolution 2083 the disclosure is
presumptive and occurs unless the designating State objects. S.C. Res. 2083, ¶ 12, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2083 (Dec. 17, 2012). As noted by the ombudsperson no designating State
has objected to disclosure of their identity since the passage of Resolution 1904. See
Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1989
(2011), ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. S/2012/49 (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter OP REPORT]. See also
Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2083
(2012), ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. S/2014/73 (Jan. 31, 2014).
44 S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009). Such additional time
cannot exceed three months. See 1267 COMMITTEE GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at ¶ 4(j) &
(k).
45 See S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011).
46 S.C. Res. 1904, Annex II ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
47 Id. Annex II ¶ 5.
48 Id Annex II ¶ 7.
49 Id. Annex II ¶¶ 810.
50 S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011).
51 Since the creation of the Office of the OP in Resolution 1989, 44 individuals and
24 entities have been delisted, and the Ombudspersons recommendation has prevailed in
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meets in closed sessions but updates to the Consolidated List are
promptly made available on the Committees web site.52
C. Global Administrative Law, Kadi II, and Continued
Criticisms of the Sanctions Regime
1. The GAL Project
The global administrative law (GAL) project is premised on the
notion that the growing exercise of transnational regulatory power has
created accountability, legitimacy, and transparency deficits as
international bureaucrats not subject to the democratic safeguards
present in the domestic context, increasingly govern individual
behavior.53 These actions, which are not primarily legislative or
adjudicative in character, can be seen as administrative and
regulatory functions.54 Thus, the globalization of regulation
necessitates the development of mechanisms and principles that ensure
global administrative bodies meet adequate standards of transparency,
participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and . . . provid[e] effective
review of the rules and decisions they make.55 These GAL principles
may be developed through a top down approach by which
international organizations and international tribunals adhere to
administrative law principles.56 Alternatively, GAL principles may be
developed through a bottom up approach by which domestic courts
and institutions apply administrative law principles to the actions of
transnational regulators and/or domestic officials directly participate in
the regime.57
2. The Kadi Cases
The CJEUs decisions in the Kadi cases,58 and a series of decisions
from other national and supranational bodies,59 demonstrate the bottom
every case. Office of the Ombudsperson of the Security Councils 1267 Committee, Status
of Cases, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/status.shtml (last
visited Jan. 9, 2015).
52 HOERAUF, supra note 6, at 218.
53 Benedict Kingsbury et. al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW
&CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 1617 (2005).
54 Id. at 17.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 3436.
57 Id. at 3134, 3637.
58 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351; Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P & C-595/10 P,
Commission v. Kadi, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 119 [hereinafter Kadi II].
59 Nada v. Switzerland, [2012] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1691, ¶ 212 (2012) (holding Swiss
implementation of 1267 sanctions violated the applicants rights under Articles 8 and 13
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up employment of GAL principles. In Kadi I, a Saudi citizen challenged
an EU asset-freezing regulation implemented pursuant to the 1267
regime.60 In 2008, the CJEU annulled the relevant EU regulation finding
that (1) EU courts were responsible for reviewing the lawfulness of all
EU acts, including those implementing UNSC resolutions,61 and (2) the
regulations infringed on Kadis fundamental rights including the right to
property, the right of defense, and the right of judicial review.62 The
CJEU was highly critical of the UNSC listing and delisting procedures
for denying the listed person an opportunity to: assert his or her
rights; be represented in the delisting procedure; and access the
reasons and evidence underlying listing and delisting decisions.63
Thereafter, the EU Council sought to comply by providing Kadi with the
UNSC narrative summary of reasons why he had been listed and
allowing him to respond.64 The EU decided to maintain the
implementation of the regulation against Kadi and he initiated a
second challenge in EU courts alleging the summary was too vague
to protect his right of defense and right to judicial review.65
In June 2013, the CJEU upheld Kadis second challenge.66
Reaffirming its holding in Kadi I, the court maintained that EU
regulations implementing UNSC resolutions do not enjoy immunity
from judicial review in EU courts.67 Furthermore, the court held that the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Unions guarantees of
the rights to defense and judicial protection required that EU authorities
disclose the relevant evidence in their possession to the individual and
ensure the individual is able to effectively respond before implementing
the EU regulation.68 Then EU authorities must examine, carefully and
of the ECHR); Treasury v. Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 2 (appeal taken from Eng.) (refusing
to give effect to domestic executive measures implementing 1267 sanctions due to the
lack of an effective remedy); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commcn
No. 1472/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008) (U.N. Human Rights
Committee ruling finding that the travel ban and listing unduly infringed upon the
complainants freedom of movement under Article 12 of the ICCPR and his reputation
under Article 17 of the ICCPR).
60 Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
61 Id. ¶¶ 32627.
62 Id. ¶¶ 32627, 345 350, 369371.
63 Id. ¶ 32324.
64 Commission Regulation (EC) 1190/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 322) 25.
65 Kadi II, 2013 E.C.R. I-0000, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, & C-595/10 P,
(CJEU July 18, 2013).
66 Id.
67 Id. at ¶ 66. Kadi was delisted by the 1267 Committee in 2012. The CJEU has a
mootness doctrine but decided not to invoke it. See Case C-314/96, Djabali v. Caisse
dAllocations Familiales de lEssonne, 1998 E.C.R. I-1149, ¶ 23.
68 Kadi II, ¶¶ 111113.
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impartially whether the reasons for listing were well founded in the
light of the individuals response and any exculpatory evidence
presented.69 Additionally, the CJEU established a standard of judicial
review requiring EU courts to review challenges to listing
designations to determine whether the decision rests upon a sufficiently
solid factual basis.70 Such review was held to require evidence
verifying the reasons advanced in the narrative summary.71 In the
absence of such evidence the court annulled the EU regulation as applied
to Kadi.72 With regard to confidential evidence, the CJEU held that the
failure of EU authorities to obtain and disclose the evidence underlying
the decision generally would not prejudice the applicant.73 However,
the court also noted that where overriding considerations of security
precluded the disclosure of certain information, it was for the court to
strike an appropriate balance between the rights of the accused and
the security of the EU, and then assess the extent to which nondisclosure
affected the probative value of the evidence.74 Notably, despite the
innovation of the Office of the OP, which predated the decision, the
CJEU held that UNSC procedures still did not necessarily guarantee
effective judicial protection.75
3. Continued Criticisms
Presently, the 1267 regime has evolved such that a listee seeking
delisting is entitled to enhanced procedural safeguards. These include
the right to be heard by the OP, who serves as an impartial, de facto
decision maker, and the right to a reasoned public decision. These
innovations have been heralded for having a substantial positive impact
on the procedural due process and fairness of the listing and delisting
procedures.76 In addition to enhancing transparency and legitimacy, 1267
modifications have enhanced State cooperation, since [t]he
consequences of a failure to [cooperate by providing requested
information to the OP] will have a more direct impact on the decision
to be taken in each case.77 This in turn enhances the quality of the
consolidated list and the CFT mission. Thus, the evolution of the 1267
69 Id. ¶ 114.
70 Id. ¶ 119.
71 Id.
72 Id. ¶ 163.
73 Id. ¶¶ 123, 127.
74 Id. ¶¶ 12529.
75 Id. ¶ 133.
76 HOERAUF, supra note 6, at 227.
77 Id. at 228.
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listing and delisting procedures must be understood as a significant
improvement from the perspective of GAL theorists.
Nonetheless, the procedural innovations were insufficient to satisfy
the CJEU in Kadi II, and commentators have continued to criticize the
UNSC procedure for persistent shortcomings in terms of transparency
and due process.78 A 2012 report (2012 Watson Report) from the
Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University
(Watson Institute) articulates some of these concerns.79 This report
highlights perceived deficiencies in the transparency of the delisting
procedure noting that a State can still prevent the OP from disclosing its
identity to a petitioner.80 Further, the OP cannot update petitioners and
relevant States while the Comprehensive Report is under consideration
by the Committee or if the delisting procedure takes place
independent of the OP mechanism.81 These deficiencies, reportedly
unnecessarily impair[] the transparency of [the] process, detracting
from credibility and fairness.82 The report further notes the lack of
reasoning behind Committee delisting decisions.83 Other scholars and
commentators have similarly articulated concerns about the lack of
transparency in the delisting process. For example, criticisms abide
concerning the lack of detail in the information accompanying member
States submissions.84 Resolution 1989 requires States to accompany
submissions with as much relevant information as possible but does
not mandate that States declassify and submit intelligence information.85
Further, compounding persisting transparency concerns is the fact that
78 Id. at 22931.
79 SUE E. ECKERT AND THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, DUE PROCESS, AND TARGETED SANCTIONS: AN UPDATE OF THE WATSON
REPORT 2122 (2012), available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Watson%20
Report%20Update%2012_12.pdf [hereinafter 2012 WATSON REPORT] (noting the
renewable nature of the OP mandate which intimates impermanence, the inability of the
OP to respond t o mistaken designations, the inability of the OP to assist petitioners in
seeking exemptions including travel exemptions to meet with the OP, and the
periodic failure of States to timely respond to OP requests for information).
80 Id. at 21. This has not yet been an issue. See OP REPORT, supra note 43.
81 2012 WATSON REPORT, supra note 79, at 21.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Vanessa Baehr-Jones, Note, Mission Impossible: How Intelligence Evidence
Rules Can Save UN Terrorist Sanctions, 2 HARV. NATL SEC. J. 447, 453 (2011) (stating
that, in practice, designation is often based on heavily redacted information with vague
details); 2012 WATSON REPORT, supra note 79, at 22 (One of the most significant
challenges faced by the Ombudsperson is access to classified or confidential
information.).
85 S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (July 1, 2011).
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the 1267 Committee still meets in closed sessions unless they decide
otherwise.86
More fundamentally the OP recommendations are not technically
binding on the 1267 Committee (or the UNSC), which can still
review delisting decisions as judex in causa sua.87 Other due process
criticisms relating to the lack of specificity in the procedural aspects of
the delisting process have noted the lack of a formal standard of
review or allocation of the burden of proof.88 Finally, it is possible that
there is no measure of GAL concordant mechanisms and principles that
could be implemented to satisfy some prominent jurists who have
contended that the 1267 regime is fundamentally flawed from a
theoretical perspective. For example, Professor José Alvarez has
contended that through resolutions like 1267 the council has entered an
undesirable legislative phase by which hegemonic international
law is used to circumvent the vehicle par excellence of community
interest, namely the multilateral treaty.89 Future UN counterterrorism
efforts should acknowledge the shortcomings and critiques that the 1267
regime has faced and seek to address them at the outset.90
D. Effectiveness
In 2006, former Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov stated, I
know of no instances in world practice and previous experience in
which sanctions have achieved their aim and proved effective.91 To
be fair, Mr. Ivanovs statement was made in contemplation of
sanctions against a State, specifically Iran. However, if Mr. Ivanovs
rather indiscriminate conclusion regarding the efficacy of sanctions was
accurate, we would expect the CFT regime to be largely enervated by
low levels of implementation, cooperation, and compliance.92
86 HOERAUF, supra note 6, at 218 (citing U.N. S.C. Comm. on Al-Qaida
Sanctions, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, ¶ 3(b) (Nov. 30,
2011)).
87 Id. at 214.
88 Id. at 218.
89 José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INTL L. 873,
87576 (2003) (citation omitted).
90 GLOBAL CENTER ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL PROCESS ON GLOBAL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION: A COMPILATION OF KEY DOCUMENTS 11 (2008),
available at http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/international_process.
pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PROCESS].
91 Steven Lee Myers, Russia says it opposes UN sanctions on Iran, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2006, at A1.
92 But see Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Global Survey of the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), at 73, U.N. Doc.
S/2011/463 (Sept. 1, 2011) (noting extensive implementation, increased solidarity,
intensified dialogue among Member States, and the value of asset freezing as a
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Notwithstanding, the inherent difficulty in measuring the
effectiveness of UNSC resolutions, there is sufficient data to confute
the conclusion that the CFT sanctions have not had a material impact.
A few attempts have been made to engage in the unwieldy exercise of
measuring the effectiveness of the 1267 CFT mandate. This article will
not seek to duplicate those efforts or engage in a comprehensive
analysis of the 1267 CFT Regimes effects on the actual financing of
terrorism. Such an exercise would invariably be undermined not only by
the difficulty of defining effectiveness in the abstract, but also in
measuring it in practice, given that critical information remains
classified.93 For example, there is no public data precisely
demonstrating the amount of Al-Qaidas liquid assets affected by 1267
implementation. A comprehensive attempt to measure effectiveness
would be hindered by uncertainty as to the tangible financial effect
asset-freezes have had and uncertainty as to the causal implications of
those unknown effects.
However, an intuitive indication of effectiveness lies in
Resolution 1267s success in generating meaningful international
cooperative action. Indeed, the 1267 Committee has made it a priority to
reach out to a variety of functional bodies in order to obtain political
and technical support for effective member-state implementation.94
Resolution 1267 generated a proliferation of reinforcing CFT initiatives
and several preexisting efforts have been reframed to address the
threats posed by modern terrorism. This polycentric network is
characterized by the deep engagement of relevant actors whose
interactions feed the autocatalytic evolutionary phenomenon spawned by
Resolution 1267.
counterterrorism tool). Between 2001 and 2011, the number of State parties to the 1999
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism increased
from 50 to 173. Id. at 6. In many jurisdictions 1267 CFT measures enjoy a
preeminent status in the domestic legal hierarchy. For example, payment of ransom
is not illegal in the United Kingdom. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY OFF THE
COAST OF SOMALIA, 201012, H.C. 1318, at 57, ¶ 113 (U.K.). Nonetheless, the British
Government has stated that the payment of a ransom to a United Nations designated
terrorist group or individual is illegal because it would contravene the al-Qaeda and
Taliban sanctions regime established by UN Security Resolution 1267 (1999). Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
93 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING
RISK ASSESSMENT STRATEGIES 42 (2008), available at http://www.fatf- gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20Risk%20Assessment%
20Strategies.pdf.
94 INTERNATIONAL PROCESS, supra note 90, at 5356.
48 U. MIAMI NATL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. V:33
E. Autocatalytic Regime Theory: Polycentrism and
Autocatalysis within the 1267 CFT Regime
1. Autocatalytic Regime Theory
The 1267 CFT Regime provides the basis for conceiving a novel
theoretical framework for understanding certain forms of international
cooperative action called autocatalytic regime theory. Autocatalysis is
a chemical or biological phenomenon in which molecules generate a
product that itself becomes the [catalyst] for the reaction which
generates the next generation product.95 A catalyst allows an
otherwise prohibitively energetically unfavorable reaction to occur
readily. For example, UNSC+FATF=CFT is a reaction where two
molecules, UNSC & FATF combine to produce CFT. Without a
catalyst, this reaction may never occur. This reaction is considered
autocatalytic if the product CFT itself acted as the catalyst for the
production of more CFT.96 Autocatalytic reactions can also be
evolutionary.97 In legal philosophy, the phrase has been used to
describe self-reinforcing interactions.98 This article similarly uses the
term to refer to a series of self-reinforcing interactions but stresses the
evolutionary component. When the UNSC incepted the CFT rules in
Resolution 1267, those rules became the catalyst for a series of
autocatalytic reactions between relevant players. These reactions have
reinforced the underlying legal rules and caused their dissemination and
evolution.
The conception of autocatalytic regime theory is similar to Robert
Keohanes regime complex in that it is marked by the existence of
several legal agreements that are created and maintained in distinct fora
95 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate
Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 136 n. 14
(2005). See also Wim Hordijk et al, Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin of Life, 12
ENTROPY 1733, 1736 (2010).
96 See generally HORDIJK ET AL., supra note 95 at 17331742.
97 The biological examples of true autocatalysis, such as in the RNA world hypothesis,
are quite complicated, and there are only a few true examples. In the RNA world
hypothesis, autocatalysis is considered the foundational mechanism for complex
evolution. Id. at 1734.
98 See e.g., Santiago Villalpando, On the International Court of Justice and the
Determination of Rules of Law, 26(2) LEIDEN J. INTL L. 243, 248 (2013) (describing the
interaction between the International Law Commission and the International Court of
Justice as an autocatalytic process in which the crystallization of opinio juris may occur
by the mutual reaffirmation of the existence of a norm, without any external practice.);
MATWYSHYN, supra note 95, at 184 (proposing a corporate information security legal
regime [that] will generate an autocatalytic set that commences the process of legal
emergence of norms, behaviors, and structures that enable continued economic
growth).
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with participation of different sets of actors.99 In a complex regime,
the rules in the elemental regimes functionally overlap, yet there is
no agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflict between rules.100 An
autocatalytic regime is similar, but distinct from a regime complex
because the underlying legal rules, in this case the binding 1267 CFT
mandate, maintain primacy in the elemental regimes extant in distinct
fora. Thus, an autocatalytic regime does not suffer from the
indeterminacy that characterizes most regime complexes. There is a
prime actor, in this case the UNSC, with the power to modify the rules.
The participants in the regime may be part of separate regimes or
regime complexes but each participant shares an overlapping interest
in the underlying legal rules. Therefore, each actor, or regime,
becomes an elemental actor within a distinct, indivisible, quasi-
hierarchical regime. The regime is polycentric in that many elemental
actors form an autocatalytic set. That is, they engage in a series of
autocatalytic interactions catalyzed by the underlying legal rules.
Ordinary autocatalysis occurs each time an elemental actor adopts the
underlying legal rules. Autocatalytic evolution occurs when interactions
between the elemental actors generate an advantageous trait such as
enhanced cooperation, coordination, implementation, compliance,
enforcement, capacity building, training, information sharing, due
process, and/or revision of the underlying legal rules.
Autocatalytic sets usually involve creation of critical feedback
loops.101 In biology, a feedback loop is a phenomenon in which
informational signals about the past or the present influence the same
phenomenon in the present or future. The feedback loops allow for
efficient assessment of the prime actor, elemental actors, and States by
one another or by external IOs, transnational actors, NGOs, and even
individuals. In autocatalytic regime theory, information can be
channeled through process-based feedback loops to accelerate the
incidence of norm dissemination and the speed of norm and regime
evolution. In the context of global counterterrorism policy, effective
feedback loops can be characterized by three elements: (1)
monitoring;102 (2) assessment;103 and (3) support/coercion.104 Feedback
99 Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INTL ORG. 277, 279 (2004).
100 Id. at 277279 (describing a regime complex as a collective of partially
overlapping and nonhierarchical regimes that vary in extent and purpose.).
101 MATWYSHYN, supra note 95, at 185. This article borrows from Matwyshyns
conception of feedback loops in a proposed corporate information security framework.
102 Monitoring includes self-reporting.
103 Identification of critical deficiencies is key to assessment.
104 The answer to whether to apply support or coercion to resolve a critical deficiency is
determined in the assessment process.
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loops can have instrumental effects including the: (1) movement towards
counterterrorism through due process; (2) increased transparency,
accountability, and legitimacy;105 and (3) cooperative phenomena such
as the scaffolding of institutional learning of best practices which will be
transferred to elemental actors over time. For example, judicial
processes within the EU have served as an important feedback loop
causing the evolution of the 1267 CFT Regime.
The anticipation of probable feedback loops is also essential to a
well-designed autocatalytic regime. As discussed infra at section
II.C.2, Kadi I contained the monitoring, assessment, and coercion of
the prime actor, the UNSC, in a single judicial opinion. Anticipation
of this occurrence may have led to an initial set of legal rules that
would have generated feedback less detrimental to UNSC credibility
and legitimacy. In any event, Kadi I played an instrumental role in
catalyzing evolution in the UNSC listing and delisting procedure,
which enhanced due process safeguards. One may be inclined to interpret
this interaction between the UNSC and CJEU as confrontational.
However, it can be alternatively understood as an evolutionary
autocatalytic interaction. The debate was never about 1267 CFT or no
1267 CFT. Rather the debate was about 1267 CFT or 1267 CFT with
more process. The evolution to 1267 CFT with more process enhanced
the 1267 CFT Regime by enhancing the rigor associated with the listing
and delisting processes. This in turn has enhanced the quality of the
consolidated list. Simultaneously, the evolution to 1267 CFT with
more process affords the regime a greater degree of legitimacy
enhancing the prospect of cooperation and implementation.
Thus, an autocatalytic regime is characterized by: (1) a supreme
set of internationally binding legal rules; (2) a prime actora
centralized authority with the power to formally modify the legal rules;
(3) a polycentric landscape populated with distinct elemental actors
sharing an overlapping interest in the legal rules; (4) autocatalytic and
evolutionary interactions among the elemental actors and the prime
actor; and (5) feedback loops to allow for accelerated norm
dissemination and evolution. In advancing the 1267 CFT mandate, this
framework has proven favorable to achieving a robust, dynamic, and
effective, cooperative response to an evolving global problem. This
section proceeds to evaluate the praxis of the elemental actors in the
1267 CFT Regime. An appraisal of their activities reveals valuable
information regarding various measures of effectiveness including
105 Transparency is generally conceived as public accessibility and reasoned public
decisions. However, increased information sharing between relevant actors can also be
considered a qualified increase in transparency.
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implementation, compliance, enforcement, and constraining of terrorist
activity. The exercise also reveals the autocatalytic reactions that
characterize the regime and the type of feedback loops most effective in
generating accelerated evolution.
2. Transnational Actors
At the forefront of cooperative CFT efforts is the FATF founded
by the G7 in 1989 to promote, monitor, and harmonize anti-money
laundering initiatives worldwide.106 FATF membership, which consisted
of sixteen countries at its inception, has expanded to thirty-six
members, including two regional organizations.107 Additionally, over
twenty-five organizations, including the UN, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) participate as observers.108 In
2001, after the 9/11 attacks and the issuance of UNSC Resolution
1373,109 the FATF expanded its mandate to include the fight against
terrorist financing.110 The most recognizable work of the
organization, a series of standards known as the FATF
Recommendations, have led to the FATF being recognized as the
global standard setter on anti-money laundering and counter terrorist
financing issues by the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank.111 Over 180 countries have endorsed the FATF
Recommendations. The first CFT recommendation called for the
implementation of UNSC CFT resolutions, including Resolution
106 History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE FATF] (last visited
June 2, 2014). This article will only focus on the FATFs role in reinforcing and
developing the CFT mandate. For an extensive discussion of the FATFs international
anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime based on
soft regulation and how it has shaped compliance with the FATF international
standards, see Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of
Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 137, 18182
(2011).
107 HISTORY OF THE FATF, supra note 106. See also FATF Members and Observers,
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/
(last visited June 2, 2015).
108 Id. Relevant UN bodies include the UN 1267 Committee, the UNCTC, and
UNODC. Other observers include, regional development banks, INTERPOL, the World
Customs Organization, and international umbrella organizations affiliated with the
regulation of financial services. For a full list, see id.
109 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
110 HISTORY OF THE FATF, supra note 106.
111 Paul Vlaanderen, President of the Fin. Action Task Force, Briefing to the United
Nations Security Council Committee, (Oct. 26, 2009), available at
https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/NEWS/PRESSRELEASE/FATF%20Briefing
%20to%20the%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Committee.pdf.
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1267.112 Characteristically of autocatalysis, the UNSC subsequently
called on all member states to implement the FATF Recommendations in
Resolution 1617.113 Thus, the FATF Recommendations have gone from
soft law instruments to universally binding standards backed by the full
weight of Article 25 of the UN Charter.114 This series of interactions
forms the paradigmatic example of autocatalysis within the 1267 CFT
Regime. 1267 CFT catalyzed the generation of FATF CFT, which in turn
catalyzed the evolution of 1267 CFT.
The FATF methodology encourages not only implementation of
the standards but also the adoption of domestic legislation that
facilitates comprehensive international CFT cooperation.115 In practice,
the FATF employs separate procedures to assess compliance levels in
members and non-member States both of which serve as paradigmatic,
process-based feedback loops. Member State compliance is evaluated
pursuant to the Mutual Evaluations process.116 The process is
designed to identify deficiencies through monitoring and assessment.117
The State being evaluated completes a series of self-assessments and is
subsequently visited by an assessment team that may be comprised of
112 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Oct.
2001), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%
20Standards%20-%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf.
113 S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). This endorsement
gave the FATF Recommendations primacy over CFT recommendations promulgated by
the Basel Committee, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the
International Organization of Security Commissions, and the World Customs
Organization. Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners:
Improving the Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22
TEMP. INTL& COMP. L.J. 1, 41 (2008).
114 Article 25 states [t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. This provision has been interpreted to mean that
decisions taken under Chapter VII, which are not recommendations, are considered
legally binding on all member states. Jared Genser & Kate Barth, When Due
Process Concerns Become Dangerous: The Security Councils 1267 Regime and the
Need for Reform, 33 B.C. INTL& COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010).
115 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AML/CFT SYSTEMS 11
(2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/
FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf. Notably, cooperation extends
beyond supplying information, to actually seizing assets and evidence, even when the
activities under investigation would not constitute a criminal violation of domestic law.
Id. at 84.
116 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, PROCEDURES FOR THE FATF FOURTH ROUND OF
AML/CFT MUTUAL EVALUATIONS 34 (2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4th-Round-Procedures.pdf.
117 Id. at 415.
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experts from the FATF, and/or World Bank and IMF officials.118
Subsequently, the FATF publishes a Mutual Evaluation Report
containing an identification of priority issues, ratings, and
recommendations.119 The follow-up process is designed to apply
sufficient peer pressure and accountability through a series of
increasingly intrusive measures.120 The FATF is currently conducting
its fourth round of mutual assessments. In its current iteration, the
process includes a technical compliance component to evaluate the
implementation of necessary legal measures and an effectiveness
component to assess whether the measures are working.121
The FATF launched the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
(NCCT) Initiative in 1999 to evaluate compliance in non-members
States.122 The NCCT initiative set up four regional bodies, known as
FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) to review implementation in both
member and non-member States, identify deficiencies, and mobilize
international pressure.123 Persistence of critical deficiencies would
result in a spot on the dreaded NCCT blacklist.124 Blacklisting could
result in a number of coercive measures including a call for FATF
members to warn companies and financial institutions to avoid the
NCCTs, sanctions, or countermeasures by FATF member states.125 All
of the 23 jurisdictions that had been identified as NCCTs in 2000 and
2001, made significant progress, and the last country was removed
from the list in October 2006.126 The FATF discontinued the NCCT
program after the World Bank and IMF joined the chorus of protests
from developing countries regarding the lack of transparency, due
process, and inclusiveness in the process.127 The International Co-
operation Review Group (ICRG), established in 2007 to succeed the
118 Id. at 46.
119 Id. at 11.
120 Id. at 19.
121 Id. at 3.
122 Jared Wessel, The Financial Action Task Force: A Study in Balancing
Sovereignty with Equality in Global Administrative Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 169, 174
(2006).
123 Id. at 17576. The four initial FSRBs included the Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe,
and Africa/Middle East. Id. at 175.
124 BEEKARRY, supra note 106, at 18182 (describing NCCT listing as a name
and shame procedure).
125 Id.
126 High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/
moreabouttheinternationalco-operationreviewgroupicrg.html (last visited June 2, 2015)
[hereinafter HIGH-RISK JURISDICTIONS].
127 Rainer Hülsse, Even Clubs Cant Do Without Legitimacy: Why the Anti-Money
Laundering Blacklist Was Suspended, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 459, 463 (2008).
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NCCT initiative, initiated a global review procedure in 2009 in response
to an appeal from the G20.128 The ICRG is essentially a resurrection of
the NCCT process with some variations. After assessment, high-risk
cooperative jurisdictions are identified and called upon to expeditiously
implement an FATF action plan.129 The coercion by blacklisting persists
in the form of a Public Statement listing high-risk uncooperative
jurisdictions.130 There are currently twenty-three high-risk cooperative
jurisdictions131 and thirteen high-risk uncooperative jurisdictions with
Iran and DPRK remaining subject to countermeasures.132
The FATF has secured immense financial support from the IMF,
World Bank, US, and EU, and in turn provides financial support to
newly established regional FSRBs.133 Presently, the number of FSRBs
has expanded to eight and they operate with delegated FATF authority
to carry out its mandate.134 The infusion of the FATF with the 1267 CFT
mandate and the consecutive generation and infusion of the eight
FSRBs are saliently illustrative of the generation of a polycentric
landscape characterized by autocatalysis. This phenomenon extends to
prominent treaty regimes such as the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational and Organized Crime (2000) and the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003), which have
incorporated the FATF standards in whole or in part.135
While they are formal IOs and not transnational actors, at this
juncture, it is appropriate to note the involvement of the World Bank
and IMF in the autocatalytic phenomenon because of their interactions
128 High-Risk Jurisdictions, supra note 126.
129 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, HIGH-RISK AND NON-COOPERATIVE JURISDICTIONS
IMPROVING GLOBAL AML/CFT COMPLIANCE: ON-GOING PROCESS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20-
%20Improving%20global%20AML%20CFT%20compliance%20_%20an%20ongoing%
20process%20%2022%20June%202012.pdf [hereinafter ICRGONGOING PROCESS].
130 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE PUBLIC STATEMENT, HIGH-RISK AND NON-
COOPERATIVE JURISDICTIONS (2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/statements/18-October-2013.pdf [hereinafter HIGH-RISK AND NON-
COOPERATIVE].
131 ICRGONGOING PROCESS, supra note 129.
132 HIGH-RISK AND NON-COOPERATIVE, supra note 130.
133 Ben Hayes, Counter-Terrorism, Policy Laundering, and the FATF: Legalizing
Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society, 14 INTL J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 2627 (2012).
134 See BEEKARRY, supra note 106, at 144 n.46. The eight FSRBs include The Eurasian
Group, Asia/Pacific Group, The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Council
of Europe group known as MONEYVAL, The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Group, The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South
America, Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering in West Africa,
and The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Id.
135 K. ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 15152
(2006).
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with the FATF. The World Bank and IMF, two of the most influential
IOs, have now expressly adopted the FATF Recommendations as part of
their financial sector assessment and adjustment programs, making
compliance with the 1267 asset-freezing measures a condition for loan
eligibility.136 Virtually all bilateral aid development agencies and
multilateral development banks have joined the autocatalytic process
and followed the lead of the World Bank and IMF in this regard.137 A
2007 Treasury Department report indicates by 2005, the IMF and
World Bank had conducted more than 50 assessments of member
countries compliance with the standards of the FATF and had provided
technical assistance on related projects in more than 125 countries.138
Like FATF assessments, these reviews serve as a feedback loops.
Notably, they fulfill the support function of feedback loops by
generating World Bank and IMF technical assistance directed at the
establishment of laws and regulations, capacity building for financial
sector supervisory and regulatory authorities, the establishment of
Financial Intelligence Units, training programs in the public and private
sectors, and support for . . . [FSRBs] to conduct their own compliance
assessments.139
While the FATF has no formal statutory, constitutional, or treaty
enforcement power, its realpolitik influence as a regulatory and
policy body is undeniable. The threat of blacklisting and sanctions in
the form of countermeasures has been instrumental in enhancing
compliance with FATF standards and, consequently with 1267 CFT
measures.140 The power of the market intuitively helps enforce the
system. Blacklisting provides a powerful market disincentive that will
diminish a States ability to procure funding and attract investment.
The system has been described as highly effective with jurisdictions
generally preferring compliance with a gun to their head to the
alternative of death by blacklisting.141 Over the years, the FATF has
136 HAYES, supra note 133, at 26. The World Bank and IMF have worked closely
with the FATF in the development o f the methodology for compliance and the
FATF mutual evaluation system. Press Release, G7, Combating the Financing of
Terrorism: First Year Report (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.
ca/finance/fm092702pr1.htm.
137 HAYES, supra note 133, at 26.
138 U.S. TREASURY DEPT, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 12 (2007),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/
nmls.pdf.
139 HAYES, supra note 133, at 26.
140 BEEKARRY, supra note 106, at 143.
141 Id. at 182.
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made some progress in employing processes designed to address gaps in
its accountability, transparency, and legitimacy.142
Each time an organization adopts the FATF Recommendations, they
simultaneously adopt Resolution 1267. Thus, incorporation of the FATF
Recommendations into the agenda of other prominent, informal, global
finance regulatory organizations has also been critical in the
dissemination of 1267 CFT norms through autocatalysis. Such
organizations include the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(Basel Committee), the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS), and, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence
Units (The Egmont Group).143
In 1995, the financial intelligence units of numerous States met in
Brussels to encourage and assist in the exchange of financial
intelligence between countries.144 The result was the Egmont Group,
an informal, thirteen-member organization whose membership has
ballooned to 139 FIUS. In 2004, the Egmont Group redefined its core
functions to include CFT.145 The heads of each of the FIUs essentially
serve as the organizations board of directors and meet annually at the
plenary session.146 While the FATF is the leading legal and regulatory
body in the area of terrorist financing, the Egmont Group can properly
be considered the most relevant transnational operational and
enforcement body.147 It serves as a centralized forum for FIUs to
cooperate in terms of the exchange of information, operational support,
training and technical assistance, personnel exchanges, and operational
and strategic collaboration.148 The Egmont Group, which also employs
process-based feedback loops, assesses the effectiveness of its FIU
members based on the quality of their analytical work and their
 ability to develop information in support of investigations and
142 Id. at 189 ([T]he [FATFs] legitimacy deficit, perhaps more relevant in the
beginning stages of its creation, has gradually been addressed, albeit in a limited
manner, providing the FATF process with a perception of greater inclusiveness and
transparency.).
143 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW
22 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fiu/fiu.pdf.
144 Id. at 23.
145 MARK PIETH ET. AL., COUNTERING TERRORIST FINANCING: THE PRACTITIONERS
POINT OF VIEW 49 (2009).
146 THE EGMONT GROUP OF FIN. INTELLIGENCE UNITS CHARTER ¶ 5.1(a), available at
http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/egmont-documents [hereinafter EGMONT CHARTER].
147 Id. at preamble.
148 Id.
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prosecutions.149 A deficient assessment can presumably form the basis
for organizational pressure, training, and/or support to enhance the FIUs
capacity.150
In now familiar autocatalytic fashion, FATF Recommendation 29
obliges States to establish a FIU to serve as the national center for
the receipt, analysis, and dissemination of suspicious transaction
reports and other information relevant to terrorist financing.151 The
interpretive note for Recommendation 29 encourages States to join the
Egmont Group once it has created a FIU.152 In turn, the Egmont Group
Charter affirms that FATF Recommendations affect all FIUs,
effectively incorporating the 1267 CFT measures into its operational and
enforcement mandate.153 The 201112 annual report reflected that of
the 111 reporting FIUs: 50% reported that they had regulatory powers
to issue CFT rules or regulations; 54% had been mandated
supervisory or compliance monitoring powers; 57% had the power to
freeze or suspend transactions; 54% had the ability to request
additional information from reporting entities; and 25% had law
enforcement powers.154
In 2007, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Japan, Slovakia, and Turkey
launched the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism
Cooperation (IPGCT) to assess the overall UN contributions to the [post
9/11] fight against terrorism and identify ways to better position
national institutions to implement UN counterterrorism policy.155 The
process evinces the potential for well-designed feedback loops to
impel the movement towards counterterrorism through due process.
It involved several workshops organized throughout 2008 to provide an
informal forum for discussion among: UN civil servants; functional,
regional, and sub-regional organizations; and civil society.156 The
summary from the third workshop in May 2008 stressed the need for
1267 listing and delisting procedures to uphold the rule of law and
149 THE EGMONT GROUP OF FIN. INTELLIGENCE UNITS, EGMONT GROUP ANNUAL REPORT
201112 iii, available at http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/annual-reports [hereinafter
EGMONT ANNUAL REPORT].
150 Id. at 20.
151 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS
24 (2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations
/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
152 Id. at 96.
153 EGMONT CHARTER, supra note 146, at 4.
154 EGMONT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 12.
155 INTERNATIONAL PROCESS, supra note 90, at i.
156 Id.
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human rights.157 In 2008, Switzerland presented the results of the
process to the UN with twenty-nine specific recommendations,158 many
of which were enacted by the UN and member States.159 The
recommendations also laid the [foundation] for the Global
Counterterrorism Forum [(GCTF)], which was established in 2011.160
The GCTF is another informal multilateral platform positioned to fill the
capacity-building objective of the G8s recently disbanded,
Counterterrorism Action Group.161 The GCTF has already demonstrated
its potential for accelerated norm dissemination through autocatalysis. In
May 2012, one of the GCTFs working groups issued a series of
criminal justice recommendations, one of which calls for the
criminalization of terrorist financing in accordance with the FATF CFT
recommendations.162
3. Formal IOs
The 1267 CFT regime has also infused formal IOs with normative
power to pursue greater implementation, enforcement and coordination
of CFT measures. Like the World Bank and the IMF, the World
Customs Organization (WCO), which also has observer status at the
FATF, has become an important actor in the 1267 CFT Regimes
autocatalytic process. Since Resolution 1373, the UNSC and WCO
have had an ongoing dialogue with the UNSC calling on the WCO to
assist and train member states for the purpose of improving their ability
to prevent illegal movement of monetary instruments.163 During 2012
and 2013, the WCO participated in three CFT missions organized by
157 Id. at 113.
158 Jessica Dacey, Swiss Team Up in Counterterrorism Offensive, SWISSINFO (Oct.
3, 2011, 1:34 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-team-up-in-counterterrorism-
offensive/31265624.
159 Improving Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, GLOBAL CTR. ON COOP. SEC.,
http://www.globalcenter.org/topics/improving-global-ct-cooperation/ [hereinafter CGCC
IMPROVING COOPERATION] (last visited May 28, 2015).
160 Id.
161 Alistair Millar, The G8s Counterterrorism Action Group: Leaving Takes
Leadership, G8MAG., June 2013, at 222.
162 See GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, THE RABAT MEMORANDUM ON GOOD
PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTOR 1314, (2012), available at https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/159873/
Rabat+Memorandum-English.pdf.
163 Mr. Hassan Baage Senior Legal Officer, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED), Statement at World Customs Forum: The WCO in the 21st Century-
Inventing our Future 4 (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.wcoomd.org/~/media/
WCO/Public/Global/PDF/Events/2008/World%20Customs%20Forum/Panel%20IIICTC
CTED.ashx?db=web.
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the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.164 Additionally, the
WCOs Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) now serves as a database
and encrypted communication tool facilitating the exchange of
intelligence necessary to administer CFT seizures.165 In 2009, the WCO
and INTERPOL jointly held the Second International Conference on
Illicit Cash Couriers, to coordinate global efforts to combat illicit cash
trafficking perpetrated by terrorist and criminal organizations.166
In Resolution 1617, the UNSC, for the first time, expressly directed
Member States and the 1267 Committee to collaborate with
INTERPOL in administering the 1267 targeted sanctions.167 Since
then, INTERPOL has developed into another elemental actor in the 1267
network contributing to increased cooperation and reinforcement of the
CFT mandate.168 In conjunction with the 1267 Committees, INTERPOL
introduced in 2005 the INTERPOLUNSC Special Notice, a notification
regarding designees on the Consolidated List.169 Once an individual
entity is added to the Consolidated List Special Notices are circulated to
all INTERPOL member countries. The Special Notices enhance the
enforcement of 1267 sanctions by:
1) Alert[ing] law enforcement authorities
worldwide to individuals and entities that are subjects
of U.N. sanctions including an asset freeze, arms
embargo, and/or travel ban; 2) Enhanc[ing] the
information available concerning sanctioned individuals
and entities, the quality of U.N. sanctions lists, and the
narrative summaries that describe the grounds for the
sanctions; 3) Provid[ing] direction on action to be
164 Council 2013 Rules of Origin Single Window, WCONEWS 18 (Oct. 2013), available
at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/wco-news- magazine/~/media/8E86989134B34169
BBC8DA4FF464824F.pdf.
165 Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/instruments-and-
tools/cen-suite/cen.aspx (last visited June 2, 2015).
166 Second International Conference on Illicit Cash Couriers, WORLD CUSTOMS
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2009/april/second-internati
onal-conference-on-illicit-cash-couriers.aspx (last visited June 2, 2015)..
167 S.C. Res. 1617, preamble & ¶¶ 89, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
168 S.C. Res. 1699, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1699 (Aug. 8, 2006) (stressing
that enhanced cooperation between the UN and INTERPOL would enhance CFT
enforcement). In 2009, INTERPOLs General Assembly approved a cooperation
arrangement between INTERPOL and the sanctions committees. See INTERPOL, AG-
2009-RES-15 (Oct. 1115, 2009).
169 Yaron Gottlieb, Article 3 of Interpols Constitution: Balancing International Police
Cooperation with the Prohibition on Engaging in Political, Military, Religious, or
Racial Activities, 23 FLA. J. INTL L. 135, 180 (2011).
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taken to implement the sanctions in accordance with
national legislation.170
In addition to contributing to 1267 enforcement by disseminating the
notice through the INTERPOL system, the Special Notice system can
enhance the quality of information on listed individuals and thereby
enhance the quality of the Consolidated List. This is another example of
the 1267 CFT rules generating an autocatalytic interaction between two
actors which leads to enhanced 1267 CFT implementation and
enforcement. If INTERPOL  [R]ed [ N]otices bestow a superior
legitimacy on [a] foreign arrest warrant[],171 Special Notices are
imbued with superlative status as they are backed by the weight of a
binding international obligation. More than 700 Special Notices have
been issued since [their] creation.172
4. NGOs
Numerous NGOs have made meaningful contributions to the
evolution of the 1267 CFT Regime including the Center on Global
Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), established in 2004 to advocate
for more relevant and effective UN counterterrorism programs.173 It has
been heavily involved in pursuing implementation of FATF CFT
recommendations, and in capacity building efforts in different regions,
particularly sub-Saharan Africa.174 The CGCC, which served as the
secretariat for the previously discussed IPGCT,175 has played a role in
raising awareness of terrorist abuse of the nonprofit sector.176 It issued a
report on this topic subsequent to a multiyear project led by the UN that
involved more than 50 states and 80 nonprofit organizations.177 The
170 Id. at 180 n. 222.
171 See U.S. Dept of Justice, U.S. Attorneys Manual § 9-15.635 (2011).
172 Special Notices, INTERPOL, www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices/
Special-Notices (last visited May, 28, 2015).
173 History of the Forum, THE FOURTH FREEDOM FORUM (2014), http://www.
fourthfreedom.org/about/our-history/. See also CGCC IMPROVING COOPERATION, supra
note 159.
174 GLOBAL CENTER ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY, WORKSHOP ON BUILDING CAPACITY IN
THE AREA OF COUNTERTERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN
GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, (2010),
available at, http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10Feb16-17_Summ
ary_Recommendations.pdf.
175 CGCC IMPROVING COOPERATION, supra note 159.
176 See generally Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, To Protect and
Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit
Sector (2013), available at http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
CGCC_Prevent-Protect-Report_pgs.pdf.
177 Id. at 2.
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report advocates for accountability and legitimacy within 1267
implementation systems by recommending increased dialogue with
banks and financial institutions and maintaining there can be no one-
size-fits-all approach to regulating the nonprofit sector.178 The CGCCs
efforts in this regard demonstrate how NGOs can serve as feedback loops
generating more normatively desirable CFT measures by applying
pressure for relevant actors to balance due process and human rights
against law enforcement needs.
A 2009 report by the Watson Institute, prepared by Sue Eckert and
Thomas J. Biesteker, demonstrates this point even more saliently.179 The
2009 Watson Report successfully called for the UNSC to establish the
Office of the OP in response to Kadi I.180 The Targeted Sanctions
Consortium (TSC), a joint effort of the Watson Institute and the
Graduate Institute of Geneva, released an empirical study assessing the
effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions in August 2012 (2012 TSC
Report).181 The 2012 TSC Report builds upon the framework advanced
by Francesco Giumelli for evaluating effectiveness of UNSC sanctions
based on the achievement of three discrete purposescoercing,
constraining, or signaling.182 Constraining is achieved when sanctions
succeed in denying or delaying a targets access to essential
resources needed to engage in a proscribed activity . . . or in raising
costs.183 Upon analyzing 56 cases from 16 different sanctions regimes
administered over the past 20 years, including the 1267 regime, the
study concludes targeted sanctions have been effective in achieving the
constraining purpose 31% of the time.184 The empirical data borne
out in the study suggest that particularly high levels of effectiveness
have been achieved in constraining Al-Qaida and Taliban targets.185 The
TSC and its contributors demonstrate how NGOs, academic institutes,
178 Id. at 17.
179 2009 WATSON REPORT, supra note 28.
180 Id. at 2728.
181 DESIGNING UNITED NATIONS TARGETED SANCTIONS: INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE
TARGETED SANCTIONS CONSORTIUM (TSC), EVALUATING IMPACTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
UN TARGETED SANCTIONS, THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE PROGRAMME FOR THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE. (Aug. 2012), available at
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/
PSIG_images/Sanctions/Designing%20UN%20Targeted%20Sanctions.pdf.
182 Id. at 9 n.5 (citing FRANCESCO GIUMELLI, COERCING, CONSTRAINING, AND
SIGNALIZING: EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AFTER
THE COLD WAR (Colchester, UK: ECHR Press, 2011)).
183 Id. at 910.
184 Id. at 14.
185 Id. at 16.
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and even individual academics can become important elemental actors in
the autocatalytic evolutionary process.
III. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the 1267 CFT Regime, the emergence of the
autocatalytic regime is a phenomenon with far- reaching implications
for global politics. Its capacity for generating institutionalist
cooperation and for accelerating the global dissemination of intrusive
legal norms is remarkable in the context of counterterrorisma high-
political and deeply contentious matter at the core of domestic security
policy. The autocatalytic regime may provide a basis for understanding
other phenomena in international relations and for envisaging other
regulatory frameworks for resolving global collective action problems. In
addressing dynamic and multifaceted problems, singular regimes, such as
treaty regimes, are hampered by their staticism and deficiency in
providing a platform for interdisciplinary cooperation.
Regime complexes, on the other hand, are characterized by
dysfunctionality and indeterminacy. Meanwhile, the polycentric nature
of the autocatalytic regime provides for cooperation by various
international players with expertise in distinct disciplines based on an
overlapping interest. Feedback loops afford the autocatalytic regime
dynamismthe capacity for flexible adaptation through evolutionary
processes. The primacy of the underlying legal rules means they will
enjoy immense normative power thereby accelerating cooperative
processes and dissemination. It also means the application of the
autocatalytic regime is limited to scenarios in which an international
authority enjoys the predominant authority to imbue the underlying
legal rules with primacy in every relevant forum extant in a
polycentric landscape. As demonstrated by the 1267 CFT Regime,
the autocatalytic regimes capacity for accelerated and protean
dissemination of legal norms also magnifies the concerns associated
with the exercise of transnational regulatory power. These concerns
enhance the importance of GAL concordant mechanisms and
perceptively designed feedback loops to address problematic gaps as
they emerge.
